

PSD2, SCA, WTF?

What to expect from the EU legislation

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
# **%** Welleyrobinson





## Assumptions


Your users have something of value connected to an account





## Assumptions


2. A user can only access the value once they are authenticated





## Assumptions


3. A successful impersonator could also access that value





#### Account Takeover Fraud Hits Record High, Nearly Triples in 12 Months

Figure 13: Account Takeover Fraud Incidence Rate and Dollar Amount of Losses, 2011–2017




# How common is this?

Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2018



#### Account Takeover Fraud Hits Record High, Nearly Triples in 12 Months

Figure 13: Account Takeover Fraud Incidence Rate and Dollar Amount of Losses, 2011–2017



\$5.1B\$
In 2017

Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2018



#### PSD2

Payment Services Directive 2

# The original PSD (2007)

Paysafe:

- Objective: create a single market for modern payment services in the EU
- Add consumer protections
- Paved the way for new payment disruptors





#### What is PSD2? (2015)

- Updated regulations governing payment service providers in the European Union
- Applies to card not present (online) transactions
- Increase safety of cross-border payments



What's new in 2019?

Strong customer authentication (SCA)

for all purchases over €30



#### Scenarios where SCA applies:

The payer...

Accesses
its payment
account
online


Initiates an electronic payment transaction

Carries out any [risky] action through a remote channel



#### **AUTHENTICATION FACTORS**

#### Two are required to achieve SCA











Beginning 14 September 2019, non-compliant payments that require SCA will be declined.



# Dynamic Linking Explained



#### Dynamic Linking Explained

- Each transaction must have a unique authentication code
- Specific to the transaction amount and recipient
- Both amount and recipient are shown to payer

Use code 312568 to approve your Flourish and Blotts transaction of €713.00 to Gilderoy Lockhart



# Dynamic Linking Security Requirements



(a) the payer is made aware of the amount of the payment transaction and of the payee;



(a) the payer is made aware of the amount of the payment transaction and of the payee;

Ensure the user is confident they are authenticating the right transaction.

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(b) the authentication code
generated is specific to the amount
of the payment transaction
and the payee agreed to by the payer
when initiating the transaction;



(b) the authentication code generated is specific to the amount of the payment transaction

Any code must be used for that specific transaction only.



(c) the authentication code accepted by the payment service provider corresponds to the original specific amount of the payment transaction and to the identity of the payee agreed to by the payer;

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(c) the authentication code accepted by the payment service provider corresponds to the original specific amount

Once a valid code is accepted, other channel codes are invalidated.

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(d) any change to the amount or the payee results in the invalidation of the authentication code generated.



(d) any change to the amount or the payee results in the invalidation of the authentication code generated.

If transaction details change, invalidate all outstanding codes.

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# How to Implement SCA



#### SMS


- No app install required
- Easily include transaction info in the message body
- Vulnerable to phishing & man in the middle attacks

Use code 312568 to approve your Flourish and Blotts transaction of €713.00 to Gilderoy Lockhart



#### Transactional TOTP

- Requires Authy
- Works offline
- Based on the Time-based One-time
   Passwords RFC 6238 standard
- More secure than SMS





#### Push Authorization

- Requires a special app (or SDK + dev work)
- Cryptographically most secure
- Seamless user experience
- Easily customize with your brand





Research groups recommend push-based authentication over SMS because of the secure connection between the retailer, the 2FA service, and the device, removing opportunities for phishing.

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# Security = Friction



# Friction = Abandoned carts

#### Time is money

- Slow transactions may lead to fewer sales
- Offer options (+retries) to keep customers happy



#### What next?

- Are you a payment service provider?
- Does your PSP already provide a solution?
- Do you need to build your own solution?





#### Resources

**About PSD2 + SCA** 

Understanding Dynamic Linking

Twilio PSD2 E-Book

Stripe's Guide to SCA

McKinsey Report on PSD2

Wikipedia PSD Reference

**Implementing SCA** 

Twilio Documentation

Transactional TOTP Guide

Push, SMS Guide with Twilio + Python

## THANKYOU

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